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Abstract: 
 
Harry Truman is an overshadowed figure in presidential politics and history. 
His presidency was wedged between two titans of the office, the politically 
savvy Franklin Roosevelt and universally beloved war hero Dwight 
Eisenhower, and his overall influence and impact is downplayed when 
compared these two men. This research examines what influence Truman 
exerted upon the executive branch by asking “how has Harry Truman 
influenced the foreign policy decision making process of office of the 
presidency and how, if at all, could his actions be considered modern?” 
Through a comparative case study analysis of four foreign policy events, this 
paper highlights the progression of Truman’s decision-making process and 
shows how it assumed a modern style. 
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The presidency as an institution is one of the most fascinating and controversial 
leadership positions in the world. Faced with an ambiguous set of powers loosely defined 
by Article II of the United States Constitution, the 44 men who have occupied the White 
House have had to decide how to best approach executive power and decision-making 
without overstepping any perceived or traditional institutional boundaries. With a large, 
expansive Executive Office of the Presidency and the advent of modern technology, 
specifically television, presidents are now categorized into two primary groups, pre-
modern and modern. Sitting on the cusp of this transition was the 33rd president, Harry 
Truman. Occupying the office from 1945 -1953 Truman was in office immediately after 
the tumultuous changes brought by FDR that impacted virtually all areas of the 
presidency. One way in which FDR was not modern was in his personal decision making 
style. Truman – lacking the charisma and political acumen of FDR, had a chance to 
greatly change the executive branch decision-making process, an area that FDR address. 
With this in mind, the question must be asked whether or not Truman was able to 
contribute to the development of the office of the presidency that in a meaningful way 
that helped prepare future presidents for the duties expected of them in a modern world? 
This question is important because Truman is often a forgotten figure in 1940 -
1950’s era politics due to the two men who preceded and followed him, respectively. 
Many people cite FDR as the first president to drastically expand presidential powers and 
have a firm grip on the public relations aspect of the presidency (i.e. fireside chats, 
powerful orator, New Deal, etc.).  Dwight Eisenhower was the product of WWII and the 
public’s desire for a strong leader who would confidently lead the United States during a 
time of global uncertainty and turmoil. Between these two presidential titans sat a man 
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whose political career was born out of crooked Missouri politics and who many believed 
would fail miserably following the death of Roosevelt. Instead, he expanded presidential 
powers and helped to institutionalize much of the executive branch’s decision-making 
process. Truman exhibited many modern traits that his predecessors did not, especially 
within the realm of foreign policy decision-making.  Particularly, to what extent did 
Harry Truman help shape the foreign policy decision making process of the office of the 
presidency and how, if at all, his actions would be considered "modern?  
There are four particular cases that illustrate the effect Truman had on the foreign 
policy decision-making process of the executive branch. These cases are: the dropping of 
the Atomic Bomb, the creation and implementation of the Marshall Plan, the handling of 
the Berlin Crisis/Airlift, and the Korean War. In each of these foreign policy cases, I will 
be looking for indicators of Truman’s modernity and clues that point to his long-term 
impact on the presidency.  
Literature Review 
There are three distinct bodies of research that apply to the study of Truman and 
decision making: what defines the modern presidency as an institution, the presidential 
decision making process (foreign policy in particular), and Truman’s specific decision 
making style and executive action. Combining these various sources with the rest of this 
literature review, we can start to see the extent to which Harry Truman should be 
considered a modern president.  
The literature regarding what defines the modern presidency as an institution, 
presidential decision-making process (foreign policy in particular), and Truman’s specific 
decision-making style, illustrates how Harry Truman marked an important and 
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noteworthy transition between the pre-modern and modern presidential eras. Although he 
cannot be considered completely modern, there are two important factors that I believe 
define Truman’s modernity: the expansion of the EOP staffing system and the increased 
presidential responsibility over foreign policy affairs, including: the development of the 
National Security Council and the role of various advisors.  
The first substantial body of evidence that relates to presidents and foreign policy 
decision-making looks at the presidency as an institution and how the executive branch 
operates. George Edwards and Stephen Wayne (2010) note how the “contemporary 
presidency bears little resemblance to that which the framers of the Constitution” had 
originally intended (2010, 5). They examine how the policy-making role of the president 
has drastically expanded and predictably conclude that FDR was the first modern 
president because his administration was “characterized by presidential activism in a 
variety of policy-making roles” (2010, 7). Edwards and Wayne’s assertion is in no way 
novel or unique; it is generally agreed upon that FDR was the first modern president. 
 Even though there seems to be a general consensus that FDR was the catalyst for 
the development of the modern presidency, Nichols (1994) claims that the modern 
presidency is a misnomer because every presidential administration has exhibited modern 
characteristics but one fairly recent development that clearly defines a great modern 
presidency has been the use of presidential authority to foster the expansion and 
organization of the executive branch’s personnel.  
 Edwards and Wayne detail two models that have been used to organize 
presidential staff, the hierarchical model and the spokes of the wheel model. Even though 
more recent presidents have tried the spokes of the wheel model, they all return to the 
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reliable hierarchical model because it better regulates the flow of information, 
appointment making, and project oversight. They also highlight that clearly differentiated 
roles and a clear operational hierarchy characterize a modern presidential staff. Within 
this hierarchy, James (1969) highlights the importance that a strong and diverse staff 
plays when it comes to the institutionalized duties and expectations of a modern 
president. She notes that with the increased demands placed on the president, he needs to 
have a staff hierarchy that can provide him with the appropriate resources to intelligently 
make decisions. Hart (1987) similarly comments on the importance of having a capable 
staff. Detailing the increased power of the Executive Office of the President, Hart argues 
that the White House Office has expanded to help with three critical components of the 
modern presidency – control of the executive branch, political outreach, and policy 
advice. Having a competent staff that handles these day-to-day operations is necessary 
for a modern president to focus on the larger issues at hand.  As staff expanded to handle 
these operations, the process by which controlling these employees had to become more 
formalized. Pfiffner (2000) describes the importance of having a centralized figure, other 
than the president, to delegate tasks and handle trivial conflicts. He asserts that the 
contemporary White House cannot operate without an effective chief of staff, or someone 
acting in a similar capacity.  
I argue that the development of the extensive and multilayered executive office 
staff is a central measure for a president’s modernity. It is the one primary factor (other 
than the use of radio, TV, etc.) that truly separates modern presidents from their 
predecessors. According to Shaw (1987), the “difference between the two eras lies in 
the…institutionalization of the White of Staffing in the modern era compared with the 
5
Gill: Presidential Modernity: Harry Truman and the Foreign Policy Decis
Published by University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well, 2016
 6 
low-key, small-scale pragmatism of the earlier period.”1 Even though Roosevelt was the 
first president to expand the size of the executive staff, Truman and his efforts to 
institutionalize the Executive Office of the President clearly exhibit the key modern 
characteristics. 
A second substantial area of research that directly relates to the executive office 
staff examines the presidential decision making process. In addition to handing the 
everyday operations of the executive branch, Walcot and Hult (2005) agree with James, 
Hart, and Pfiffner that the presence of a structured, hierarchical staff defines a 
contemporary presidency and helps with the presidential decision-making process. They 
take it a step further by claiming that advocacy from multiple individuals must 
supplement the standard model of staff hierarchy in order to provide a more 
comprehensive and balanced approach to decision making.2 Multiple qualified 
individuals must all present their viewpoints and opinions together in a meeting with the 
president so that he or she will be able to make an informed and expedient decision. 
Similarly, Edwards and Wayne assert that the president cannot just be provided with 
differing views. These views must also be advocated for so that through the process of 
debate, the best ideas and assertions rise to the top.  
These advocates can be any number of individuals, including cabinet heads, 
members of Congress, and personal advisors. Steven Redd focuses on the role of advisors 
to the decision making process (2002). Redd finds that presidential decision-making has 
become a communal affair between the Chief Executive and his advisors. This small                                                         1 Shaw, M. (1987). The Modern Presidency: From Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Harper & Row. 2 Walcott, C. E., & Hult, K. M. (2005). White House Structure and Decision Making: Elaborating the 
Standard Model. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 314.  
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group of people help the president by iterating the political ramifications of various 
decisions and help him process complex and multi-faceted problems. Despite their 
critical role, these advisors often have a difficult time disagreeing with their boss. Not 
only are their jobs at risk, but Edwards and Wayne also acknowledge that presidents, 
because they rely on their personal staff for information and to carry out specific duties, 
usually select individuals that have similar beliefs, attitudes and opinions. When 
everyone has the same beliefs, there usually lacks a presence of dissention and 
constructive debate. Additionally, when the president has a relatively homogenous group 
of aides, it tends to promote groupthink during high stress situations. According to Irving 
Janis (1972), the stress promotes unanimity and eliminates the productive and necessary 
debate between advisors who have differing opinions, and the author documents how 
major foreign policy decisions reflected a lack of healthy disagreement and discussion. 
As America’s global involvement expands, presidents have to increasingly focus 
on foreign opponents and balance their roles as Commander and Chief and Chief 
Diplomat. Beginning with WWII, Phil Williams (1982) highlights the important 
distinction that, different from other wars, the national crisis did not end following the 
signing of the Japanese Instrument of Surrender. The Cold War with Soviet Russia forced 
the once temporary notion of the wartime presidency into a permanent role.  The 
expanded duties as a result have forced the president to assume a more active foreign 
policy stance and, after examining John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, two modern 
Cold War presidents, Newmann (2014) identifies six key areas to consider when looking 
at presidential foreign policy decision making: formal decision-making processes, 
informal decision processes, prime movers, horizontal range of participation, vertical 
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range participation, and coalition structure. By combining these variables, one can then 
approach how modern presidents conduct foreign policy. 
The final body of relevant research examines Harry Truman, especially the effect 
he had upon the presidency as an institution and his foreign policy decision-making and 
strategy. When Truman left office, Ferrell outlines two areas in which he made a 
fundamental impact: the way he transformed the executive branch and his personal 
leadership qualities exhibited while president.3 Truman felt that, following FDR, the 
executive hierarchy was disjointed and unorganized. McCullough (1992) explains that 
the early years of the Truman presidency was classified by uncertainty and confusion. 
Roosevelt appointments frequently disregarded Truman’s orders and thought themselves 
better than their new boss. Once a majority of these individuals resigned or were replaced 
by Truman, the staff hierarchy stabilized and Truman was able to implement his vision 
for the institutional structure of the executive branch. 
For example, under Truman, the cabinet was given more concrete duties, such as 
attending regular meetings and conferences with the president and close aides.  Similarly, 
Pfiffner notes that, although Truman did not have a formal chief of staff and appointed 
somewhat dubious individuals to important posts, it was under his administration that 
more authority was delegated to staffers and that they started to receive more fixed and 
long-term assignments.4 As their duties increased, these staffers started to hire their own 
aids and the multilayered executive office we now know today started to take shape.  
                                                        3 Ferrell, R. (1983). Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.  4 Pfiffner, J. (2000). The Modern Presidency. Boston, MA: Bedford St. Martin's Press. 48. 
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Within foreign policy, Ferrell points out that although he assumed an active 
stance, similar to his predecessor, Truman’s foreign policy strategy differed from 
Roosevelt because he was willing to bridge the gap with Europe and the Far East. Before, 
America preferred to “maintain a distance from Europe, and often celebrated its 
stupidities, but all of this ended during the Truman administration.”5 In order to address 
America’s growing influence on the world stage and to handle the country’s new 
responsibilities post WWII, Truman needed to find ways to consolidate power among the 
various military branches.  This desire to create a more centralized planning structure was 
reflected through the development of the National Security Council (NSC). This 
apparatus, created by the National Security act of 1947, was intended to consolidate the 
national security decision-making process and assemble the various military and 
domestic department heads into one council that could help the President. When the NSC 
was in its formative stages, government officials disagreed over what powers should be 
granted to the council. Burke (2009) highlights the various attempts made by powerful 
government individuals, including Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, to give the 
Senate power to name the NSC’s executive director and to grant the NSC policymaking 
authority. Forrestal tried mightily to bring the NSC under the Pentagon’s control but after 
strong statements by President Truman and through cunning action by Truman’s aides, 
the NSC was housed under the Executive office of the President and was solely advisory 
in nature.  
In addition to the development of the NSC, there is a body of research that 
highlights specific cases which, combined, can better illustrate Truman’s decision-
making process and his impact on the modern presidency. Richard Neustadt (1980) and                                                         5 Ferrell 65. 
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Harry Price (1955) detail the implementation of the Marshall plan following the end of 
WWII. Both Barton Bernstein (1975) J. Samuel Walker (1997) examine Truman’s use of 
the Bomb in Japan. Roger G. Miller (2000) looks at the Berlin Airlift while Dean 
Acheson (1971) and Gary Hess (2009) focus on the Korean War. Finally, David 
McCullough’s biography on Harry Truman helps to fill any gaps in these cases and 
provides a general overview of Truman’s presidency.  
Research Design 
Harry Truman had a significant and meaningful impact upon the foreign policy 
decision-making process of modern presidents. He provided the initial institutionalized 
staff framework for the Executive Office, and he began the process of encouraging a 
structured, well-defined environment that efficiently and meaningfully assigns projects 
and duties to advisors and staff members. For these reasons, Harry Truman is a critical 
case in the development of the foreign policy strategy and decision making process of the 
executive branch. There are no formal dependent or independent variables to my 
research. Instead, I am focusing on Harry Truman’s behavior in office. By combining 
examples from cases with the framework for a modern presidency, I hope to demonstrate 
that Harry Truman fit primarily within the framework of a modern president and that he 
institutionalized decision-making process.  
In order to determine the extent to which did Harry Truman helped shape the 
foreign policy decision making process of the office of the presidency and how these 
actions classify him as a modern president, a case study analysis will be the best 
approach.  Although there might be some quantitative data related to my topic, the best 
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and most appropriate kind of data I will use comes from descriptive, qualitative case 
studies.  
That being said, case studies are not without weaknesses. For example, the 
amount of information needed to adequately address cases is often exhaustive. Who is to 
say that the researcher covered/omitted all of the relevant facts and let their personal bias 
creep in? Another problem relates to the poor external validity that often plagues case 
study analysis. By looking at a narrow and focused phenomenon, it is hard to generalize 
the findings to other situations.  Finally, there is considerable debate regarding the 
strength of the casual inferences made under case study design. Without quantitative data, 
how can one definitively prove what exactly influenced the dependent variable or 
observed phenomenon beyond the details in the cases. 
Even in the face of these shortcomings, case studies can still be helpful and 
necessary means of collecting information. They can address difficult to observe 
phenomenon, help gather information on specific and narrow topics, but most important 
is that they allow for a deeper examination of concepts and causal processes. It is for this 
final reason that the case study approach is the most appropriate method for collecting 
information for my paper. I cannot physically manipulate the variables of my study since 
it has a focus in the past, I am attempting to answer a “how” question, and Truman’s 
effect on presidential foreign policy decision making process is a phenomenon that is 
relatively difficult to observe.  A comparative case study analysis is the only research 
design that could come close to effectively answering my research question. 
Under this design, I will have one critical case and multiple individual studies that 
branch off of this central case. The critical case in this design will be Harry Truman and 
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his tenure as president. Under this somewhat broad critical case, there are four main 
foreign policy issues during Truman’s presidency that specific cases will examine in 
greater detail: the dropping of the Atomic Bomb, the implementation of the Marshall 
plan, the Berlin airlift, and the Korean War. Under each of these cases, there are five 
factors that determine modernity: formal meetings, role of advisors, level of presidential 
accountability/decisiveness, residual Roosevelt influence, and whether the decision 
followed the spokes of the wheel or hierarchical model of leadership (hierarchical being a 
modern strategy). Ideally, with each of these factors, we will see Truman’s foreign policy 
decision making evolve into a more modern process.  
For the Atomic Bomb, I examine the works of Bernard Bernstein and Samuel 
Walker. These author’s are key because while Walker’s piece has a Truman focus, 
Bernstein also factors in Roosevelt’s influence upon the drop of the Atomic Bomb.  For 
the Marshall Plan, I will be using Richard Neustadt and his book on presidential power. 
This source is key because it details Truman’s relationship with General Marshall and 
provides less historical background, helping to emphasize the salient pieces of 
information. I will use the research of Roger Miller to examine the Berlin Airlift and I 
plan on using Truman’s Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s account The Korean War, as 
well as research from Gary Hess, to investigate the Korean War.  For all of these cases, 
David McCullough’s Truman will also help to fill blank areas and will reinforce weak 
areas of my argument.  
My case study approach has poor external validity. Examining Truman 
specifically, this study cannot be generalized or applied to other presidents or larger 
political trends/movements but this is not my goal for this paper. I intend to use these 
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case studies to look closely at how Truman affected the office of the presidency. As a 
result, the internal validity of this study is quite strong because of the extensive and 
tightly focused nature of these cases. Each case study that I have chosen to examine 
contains a wealth of information because each of these foreign policy developments was 
extremely significant. For my paper, I am only going to focus on how Truman made 
decisions and how his staff his was involved with these decisions.  
Ideally, I expect that the case study approach to these various foreign policy 
developments under the Truman administration show that Truman is the father of modern 
presidential foreign policy decision-making process. Whether or not the thesis is proven, 
a case study design is the only feasible way I can attain the information needed to address 
this sort of question. I turn now to the first of the four cases 
 
The Atomic Bomb 
Harry Truman assumed office at a critical junction during WWII. The Germans 
were on the defensive in Europe and the United States forces were making noticeable 
gains in the Pacific. These gains, although strategically important, came at great cost. The 
bloody pacific battles, including Leyte Gulf and Iwo Jima were still fresh in the 
memories of all Americans when Truman took over following Roosevelt’s untimely 
death in April of 1945. Seeking to quickly resolve hostilities in the Pacific, Truman was 
immediately briefed about America’s fearful new weapon, the Atomic Bomb.  
As Vice-President, Truman knew nothing about the Bomb. Roosevelt kept him 
largely in the dark about the Manhattan Project and any details related to the 
development, construction, or testing of the powerful weapon. It was only after Truman 
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became president that he was fully briefed on the Bomb and it’s implications. Following 
the successful test of the Plutonium Bomb, Truman felt sufficiently comfortable with the 
technology and directed his aids to determine the best cities in Japan on which to drop the 
deadly projectile.6 One month later, on August 6, the  B-29 Superfortress Enola Gay 
dropped the first ever Atomic Bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. Following a 
second bombing of Nagasaki on August 9th, the Japanese rulers finally acquiesced to 
American demands and unconditionally surrendered, thereby disbanding their ruling 
aristocracy and removing the Emperor they so fanatically followed.  
The process leading up to the dropping of the Atomic Bombs provides the first 
glimpse into how Truman initially approached foreign policy decision-making in the war 
context. Immediately following his swearing in, Truman was approached by Roosevelt’s 
Director of the Office of War Mobilization James Byrnes and was informed about the 
existence of the Manhattan Project. On April 25, Truman held a follow up meeting with 
Byrnes, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, and Lieutenant General Leslie Groves It was at 
this meeting that Groves explained the Manhattan Project in greater detail and Truman 
agreed to Stimson’s request that a special committee be formed to “consider the 
implications of the new weapon …especially…for the post war era.”7 This committee 
reached two important conclusions, that the Bomb should be deployed without warning 
and should target a large industrial area supporting the Japanese war effort as “to make a 
profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible” and that no 
                                                        6 Walker, J. (1997). Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the use of Atomic Bombs against Japan. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.  
7 Walker 15.  
14
Scholarly Horizons: University of Minnesota, Morris Undergraduate Journal, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/horizons/vol3/iss1/2
 15 
information shall be shared with Soviets regarding the Bomb or America’ s atomic 
progress.8 
Truman generally shared these concerns but wanted to ensure that the United 
States had a working version of the Bomb before any further action was taken.  After he 
was informed of the successful test of the Plutonium Bomb, Truman was now faced with 
a few key questions that needed to be addressed: To what extent should the Soviets be 
informed of the American’s atomic progress and was Soviet intervention even necessary 
following the successful detonation at Alamogordo? Although Truman always 
maintained that he traveled to the Potsdam Conference to secure Soviet participation in 
the Pacific, the stunning success of the Plutonium Bomb detonation had many of 
Truman’s closest advisors, even George Marshall, questioning whether or not Russia was 
actually needed to end the war.9 After multiple formal meetings and consultations with 
advisors, Truman agreed with Byrnes that Soviet influence in the Pacific should be 
limited and that the Bomb should be used as a powerful diplomatic tool.10 As a result, the 
Soviets were kept in the dark and plans went ahead to drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan. 
The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was one of the first and, arguably, one 
of the most important foreign policy decisions made by Harry Truman. What many fail to 
realize is that, while Truman is credited for dropping the Bombs on Japan, it was 
Roosevelt who actually irrevocably set the wheels in motion to dropping the Bomb. For 
example Truman, when he assumed office, wanted to continue Roosevelt’s policies sand 
live up to the man’s legacy. Therefore, it was just assumed that the Bombs would be used                                                         8 Walker 17. 
9 Bernstein, B. J. (1975). Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A 
Reinterpretation. Political Science Quarterly. 45 10 Walker, J. (1997). Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the use of Atomic Bombs against 
Japan. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press. 66  
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on Japan.11 Additionally, many of Truman’s advisors at this time were Roosevelt 
appointees, including the man who had a significant influence on the decision to drop the 
Atomic Bombs, primarily James Byrnes.12 All of these factors combined, including 
steadfast public support of unconditional surrender by Japan, led Truman to drop the 
Bomb.  
 Even though this process seemed like a Roosevelt initiative, there were glimmers 
of Truman’s new decision-making style and his steps towards institutionalizing the 
decision making process. For example, Truman actually listened to his advisors opinions 
and respected their experience. Following the conclusion of the Okinawa campaign, 
Truman called together the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a meeting with the purpose of ending 
the war with Japan. Instead of telling the Chiefs what he wanted, Truman merely listened 
and accepted their recommendation that the island of Kyushu should be attacked first. 
Although he did make his intentions clear that he wanted to end the war as quickly and 
with as little American casualties as possible, Truman still accepted the opinions of the 
Chiefs of Staff and understood the value of their arguments.13  
As the talks and meetings wore on regarding Japan, Truman usually deferred to 
the wishes of his advisors when he did not have a strong opinion on an issue or was 
unsure of the correct decision (in the case of Byrnes wanting to delay Soviet entry into 
the war with Japan). When, on the other hand, he was sure on an issue, he acted 
decisively.14 Even though Truman involved his advisors in the decision making process, 
                                                        11 Bernstein, B. J. (1975). Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation. Political Science Quarterly. 35 12 Bernstein 35. 
13 Walker, J. (1997). Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the use of Atomic Bombs against Japan. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press. 37 14 Walker 74. 
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it was more due to the fact that he wanted to adhere to Roosevelt’s policies.15 Even 
though Truman did begin to institutionalize the decision making process during the 
Atomic Bomb deliberations (multiple formal meetings with advisors and National 
Security Council), it took another foreign policy crisis that was further removed from 
Roosevelt’s death that highlighted Truman’s independent effect on the presidential 
foreign policy decision-making process: the rebuilding of Europe. 
European Bailout 
After 6 consistent years of brutal fighting, by April of 1945 Germany was 
physically and morally beat and finally surrendered. Unfortunately, the end of the war did 
not bring a return to prosperity; the European continent lay in ruins. Years of strategic 
bombing by both sides left major cities heavily damaged (if not completely annihilated), 
and displaced thousands of citizens. Facing a complete collapse of the Europe, Truman’s 
Secretary of State George Marshall, in his famous Harvard speech of 1947, proposed the 
European Recovery Program, an ambitious and far reaching proposal that would see the 
United States loan European nations billions of dollars in economic aid. After approval 
by Congress, the plan went into effect and pumped vital aid into the beleaguered 
European economies. Whether or not Truman had a direct influence on the plan or its 
implementation, he had to ultimately decide whether or not the administration would put 
forward a plan to save European economies.  
 Following the war, a bailout of the struggling European economies was a key 
issue on Harry Truman’s foreign policy agenda. Even before the war was entirely 
finished, Truman already had the idea of rebuilding Europe on his mind. Swayed by                                                         15 Bernstein, B. J. (1975). Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A 
Reinterpretation. Political Science Quarterly. 34 
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Stimson, who believed that an economically strong Germany was vital to the overall 
stability of the European continent, Truman believed that sharing America’s wealth and 
prosperity with impoverished/struggling nations would help to spread democratic ideals 
of freedom and liberty around the globe.16 After hearing reports from both Kennan and 
Under Secretary Clayton, it became apparent that “a collapse in Europe would mean 
revolution and a tailspin for the American economy,” and that a vibrant and robust 
Europe would be a power tool to prevent communist encroachment.17 Armed with this 
knowledge, Truman authorized his Secretary of State, George Marshall, to give a speech 
at Harvard on June 5, 1947 that outlined the Administration’s plan for bailing out Europe. 
Although Marshall was widely popular, the Truman administration faced significant 
hurdles to pass a European bailout plan through Congress. 
 In 1946, the Democrats had lost control of both Houses of Congress for the first 
time in 14 years. Truman was less than two years into his presidency via succession and 
was struggling, both in the polls and with his own party. A belligerent majority led by 
Senator Robert Taft seemed unwilling to even consider cooperating with Truman.18 Yet, 
among this harsh political climate, Truman was able to get the Marshall plan passed 
through Congress with little delay. His ability to accomplish this seemingly impossible 
feat highlights another aspect of Truman that indicates his modernity, the willingness by 
Truman to delegate significant projects to competent staffers. 
 In this case, there is a reason that the European Recovery Program is known as the 
Marshall Plan and not the Truman Plan. Truman knew that any plan with his name on it 
                                                        
16 McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 561. 17 McCullough 562. 
18 Neustadt, R., & Neustadt, R. (1980). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 36 
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would die in Congress and he had great respect for Marshall. Truman was known for 
saying that a lot could be “accomplished if you didn’t care who received the credit.”19 
Even so, although Marshall’s name was attached to the program, it’s success or failure 
would be attributed to the man who, ultimately, had the job to approve the plan. When 
Marshall was drafting the recovery plan, he received the full backing from the White 
House. Truman assigned other top cabinet officials to help draft reports and papers that 
would help with legislative presentation.20 Overall, Truman handed Marshall the reigns 
during the formative stages of the recovery program and Marshall took “extreme care to 
keep the President always informed.”21 Although Marshall took the lead while crafting 
the plan and including European countries in the planning process, Truman also took 
steps behind the scenes to help his Secretary of State succeed.  
 When individuals questioned how much aid the American economy could safely 
provide to the struggling countries, Truman created two committees tasked with crafting 
a proposal, based upon an earlier plan created by the Committee of European Economic 
Cooperation (CEEC), to present to Congress. These committees played an important role 
highlighting the dangers of a European collapse and by providing helpful and factual 
recommendations that contributed to the final makeup of the recovery program.22 Truman 
also took active steps to recruit and work with members from the other party. Senator 
Arthur Vandenburg (R-MI), the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was 
seen as the Congressional lead for all things international. He was also an advocate for 
bipartisanship and, in 1946, with a Republican Administration seemingly inevitable two                                                         19 McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 564 
20 Neustadt, R., (1980). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 40 21 McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 563 22 Price, H. (1955). The Marshall Plan and its Meaning. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 39 
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years down the road, was more willing to compromise.23 Vandenburg’s role in helping to 
win over Congressional support was crucial and was appreciated by Marshall, who called 
Vandenburg “his right hand man” and believed that he “never received full credit for his 
monumental efforts on behalf of the European Recovery Program.”24 These two men, 
along with other influential advisors, such as Clark Clifford and George Kennan, helped 
to make the Marshall plan feasible and able to pass Congress, all while receiving 
consistent support from Truman. 
The Marshall Plan represented the first large foreign policy issue on Harry 
Truman’s agenda that was not posthumously influenced by Roosevelt. Bolstered by the 
exciting and intense election of 1948, Truman confidence was renewed and “he was no 
longer Roosevelt’s ‘stand in’.”25  Although Truman was still willing to make the critical 
decisions, he had unwavering faith in Marshall and his actions. Truman’s modernity 
stems from his close relationship with Marshall and other influential advisors, such as 
Dean Acheson and, according to Louis Halle, “[Truman’s] ability to appreciate these men 
and to support them as they supported him.” This was different from Truman’s 
predecessors, especially Roosevelt, who was known for inciting conflict among his 
advisors and pitting them against each other. 
Rescuing Berlin 
Following the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the world observed the Cold War 
slowly start to develop as relations between the Soviet Union and the West became 
increasingly strained. From his public speeches and his overall attitude, it was clear that                                                         23 Neustadt, R., & Neustadt, R. (1980). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of 
Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 38  
24 As quoted in Price 65. 25 McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 555 
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Truman was going to take a hard stand against the expansion of communist influence. 
Speaking out in support of democracies around the world, Truman pledged to help any 
nation that was battling the influence of the “red menace.” Dubbed the Truman Doctrine, 
America led the Western powers in tightening down and hardening their stance against 
the Soviet Union and other communist nations. Unhappy with the actions taking place in 
western Germany and Berlin, the Russians became increasingly hostile during 
international talks with the Western powers.26 Finally, in January of 1948, the Soviets 
had enough and restricted access to East Berlin. 
 What followed was one of the most ambitious and logistically challenging relief 
efforts in American history. The Berlin airlift required hundreds of transport planes from 
America and Britain to fly continuous resupply missions into the city. Without stopping, 
the massive cargo planes were able to successfully keep the millions of individuals in 
West Berlin supplied for the year that the Soviets had the city blockaded. Seen as an 
overall success, the Berlin Airlift reflected favorably upon Truman and his 
Administration and is an interesting example of his decision making process. 
 The Berlin Airlift represented a straightforward foreign policy decision by 
Truman: let the city of Berlin starve or to cave to Soviet demands. In a June 28 strategy 
meeting, four days after Stalin ordered the blockade, Truman made his intentions clear, 
interrupting his aides and asserting that “abandoning [Berlin] was beyond the 
discussion.”27 Following this decision by Truman, the discussion turned to what was the 
best option to bail out the besieged city.  Multiple options were proposed, including 
breaking through the blockade with an armored convoy and retaliating by closing off the                                                         
26 Miller, R. (1998). 19. To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949. Washington, D.C. Air Force History and Museums Program. 27 Miller 56 
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Panama canal to Russian ships, but Truman realized the risks of using force against the 
Soviets.  
Following the end of the war and demobilization, the U.S. only had 90,821 
soldiers left in Germany. Combined with Britain’s 103,426 and France’s 75,000 
personnel, these forces palled in comparison to the assets the Soviets could muster, 
including a force between 500,000 and one million men and hundreds of T-34 tanks and 
artillery pieces.28 To avoid provoking open hostilities with the formidable Soviet army, 
Truman decided that an airlift would be the best option and ordered his commander in the 
field, General Clay, to begin a full-scale operation.29 What followed a gargantuan 
program that, in a year, saw 277,804 flights in and out of Berlin, with a total of 2,325,809 
tons of food and supplies delivered? Without an end in sight and facing an increasingly 
effective and efficient airlift from determined western powers, the Soviets realized that 
their strategy was not working and ended the blockade on May 12, 1949. A resounding 
success, the Berlin Airlift exemplified Truman’s ability to decisively act on foreign 
policy issues and give his advisors a sense of direction. 
 The airlift represents one of the first times that Truman alone acted to address a 
foreign policy crisis. It was Truman that decided that America was to remain in Berlin. It 
was Truman who decided to use an airlift as the means for supplying a city of 2,000,000 
inhabitants.  Although he sometimes held strategy meetings, “Truman had consulted none 
of the White House Staff or any of his political advisers” over the decision to use or 
execution of the airlift.30 This appears to be a step back from modern presidential 
decision-making strategy. Normally, staff is consulted, multiple solutions are                                                         
28 Miller 30. 29 McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 631 30 McCullough 631 
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recommended, and the president makes a decision. Although Truman did not consult with 
any advisors extensively regarding the airlift, his modernity is exhibited through the 
explicitness of his demands and how his advisors reacted.  
When Truman did have meetings, the goal of staying in Berlin was already 
established and the discussion surrounded logistical concerns. Truman was able to give 
his advisors a sense of direction that, in turn, allowed for a more focused and productive 
discussion surrounding solutions. For example, at a National Security Council Meeting in 
July, General Clay made it clear that Berlin people would benefit the most from an airlift 
and that more transport planes were needed in order to successfully carry out the mission. 
Even though Air Force Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg expressed concerns over 
diverting more air resources to Berlin, Truman weighed the opinions of his advisors and, 
predictably, sent more planes to Berlin. Truman’s staff and advisors still were able to 
express their opinions, but in a capacity that focused on the logistical concerns of 
carrying out Truman’s orders, rather than suggesting alternatives.31 Even though his staff 
was limited on proposing alternatives to bailing out Berlin, there are examples of how 
advisors were able to provide input on Truman’s plan, helping to solidify his desire to 
remain in Berlin.  
On July 22nd, Truman met with his then Secretary of State George Marshall and 
Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. It was at this meeting that Marshall highlighted 
recent successful efforts in Greece, Italy, Finland, and Yugoslavia that thwarted Soviet 
aspirations and asserted that “failure in Berlin…would jeopardize the current trend in 
                                                        31 McCullough 648. 
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halting communism.”32 It was not as if a majority of Truman’s advisors were against 
saving Berlin; many, including General Clay and Marshall, believed that saving the city 
was vital for containing the spread of Communism and for improving the “moral of 
Western, non-Communist Europe.”33 It is for these reasons that a decision that was 
seemingly made unilaterally and off the cuff was actually, although primarily decided by 
Truman, a well thought out plan that had significant staff and advisor input. 
Conflict in Korea 
The National Security Act of 1947, in addition to restructuring the institutional structure 
of the armed forces, also created the National Security Council (NSC). An advisory board 
comprised of various high-ranking officials from the administration and the military, the 
NSC was tasked to help the president address various foreign policy issues and crises.34 
One of their tools that helped them advise the president was their ability to draft 
comprehensive reports.  
The council’s most famous and, arguably, most influential report was National 
Security Report 68, or NSC-68. Drafted in response to the successful Soviet test of a 
nuclear bomb, it advocated for an aggressive and proactive approach to addressing 
communist expansion by using the strategy of containment. Falling in line with the 
Truman Doctrine, containment sought to provide American resources and aid to countries 
to prevent the encroachment of Communism. 
                                                        32 Miller, R. (1998). To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949. Washington, D.C. Air Force History and Museums Program. 81 33 McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 631 34 Burke, J. (2009). 18. Honest Broker?: The National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision 
Making. College Station: Texas A & M University Press.  
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It was only natural, following an all out invasion by communist North Korean 
forces of South Korea in June of 1950, that Truman was determined to intervene. What 
followed was a three-year war resulted saw hundreds of thousands of casualties and no 
clear winner.  A dubious use of presidential war power due to a lack of a formal 
authorization by Congress, the Korean War is an important case that highlights Truman’s 
decision-making process as it pertained to foreign policy crises. 
When looking at Korea, there are two main decisions Truman had to make over 
the course of the war, whether or not to involve U.S. combat forces and if he should fire 
General McArthur for insubordination. These two foreign policy decisions helped define 
the outcome of the war and demonstrated Truman’s decision making style and process.  
The June 1950 invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces came as a shock 
and surprise to many in America, including President Truman. The president immediately 
called together a meeting with his top advisors at the Blair House on June 25, 1950.35 It 
was at this meeting that his advisors reaffirmed Truman’s desire to respond to this act of 
aggression, discussed potential Soviet motivations behind the attack, and Secretary of 
State Acheson recommended that  
1. General MacArthur should be authorized and directed to supply Korea 
with arms and other equipment over and above that already allocated 
under the Military assistance Program 
2. The U.S. Air Force should be ordered to protect Kimpo airport during 
the evacuation of United States dependents by attacking any north 
Korean ground or air forces approaching it. 
3. The Seventh Fleet should be ordered to proceed from the Philippines 
north and to prevent any attack from China on Formosa or vice versa.36 
 
                                                        35 Hess, G. (2009). Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq (2nd ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 18 36 Acheson, D., & Acheson, D. (1971). The Korean War. New York: Norton. 21 
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After everyone in attendance was able to voice their opinion, Acheson’s three 
recommendations, along with instructing General MacArthur to send a survey team to 
Korea to report in, were all approved by Truman. But he held off on deploying ground 
troops at that particular moment. The following day, after receiving news about the 
rapidly deteriorating situation in Korea, Truman called another meeting at the Blair 
House. Once again, after listening to the opinions of those in attendance, he agreed with 
Acheson’s recommendation to authorize the deployment of U.S. Naval and Air units and, 
“on Tuesday, June 27, U.S. air and naval forces undertook direct support of the South 
Korean army.”37 Unfortunately this action wasn’t enough.   South Korean forces were in 
complete disarray, Seol had fallen to the North Korean soldiers, and, following a personal 
inspection by MacArthur himself, it was strongly recommended to Truman that only the 
intervention of U.S. ground forces could halt the invasion.38 Even though he was worried 
about, similar to the Berlin, provoking open hostilities with the Soviet Union, Truman 
understood the necessity of committing ground troops. After receiving these urgent 
reports from MacArthur and U.S. Ambassador to South Korea John Muccio, and after 
meeting once again with civilian and military advisors, “Truman announced that he 
would give MacArthur authority to deploy, as he deemed necessary, any ground forces 
under his command,” thereby committing full U.S. military forces and taking the country 
to war.39 
 Now that the war was underway, MacArthur was given particular instructions by 
which he was supposed to operate in the Korean theatre of war. After the U.S. forces had 
                                                        37 Hess, G. (2009). Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and Iraq (2nd ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 23. 38 Hess 27. 39 Hess 31. 
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halted the North Korean advance and had pushed the communist forces back to the 38th 
parallel, Truman assented to the recommendations of both Acheson and Marshall and 
authorized MacArthur to undertake military action north of the 38th parallel. If Marshall 
sparked a Soviet response, he was to assume defensive positions and wait for 
Washington’s instructions. If the Chinese became involved, MacArthur was “to continue 
military operations so long as the offered a reasonable chance of success.”40 Following a 
string of military successes, MacArthur became increasingly emboldened. Truman was 
uncomfortable with MacArthur’s new independence and decided to meet the General on 
the tiny Wake Island in the pacific in the Fall of 1950. MacArthur dominated this 
discussion and the conference ended without any assertion by Truman of his power over 
McArthur. Coupled with MacArthur’s order to begin an all out bombing assault on North 
Korean and Chinese targets without even consulting with Washington, there was a sense 
between Truman and his advisors that Marshall was becoming increasingly out of 
control.41 The final straw came on April 5, 1951 when MacArthur wrote a letter to the 
Minority Leader of the House that amounted “to a direct attack on [Truman’s] 
policies.”42 It was after this extremely public attack that Truman finally decided 
MacArthur must be removed from command. 
 Meeting with Marshall, Acheson, Harriman and General Bradley, Truman 
discussed various options and asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet to come up with a 
suitable replacement. The Chiefs met with Truman three days later and announced that 
they unanimously supported removing MacArthur and replacing him with General 
                                                        40 Hess 47. 41 Hess 56. 42 Acheson, D., & Acheson, D. (1971). The Korean War. New York: Norton. 103. 
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Matthew Ridgeway.43 After listening to the opinions of all of his advisors present, 
Truman approved the Chiefs of Staff’s recommendation and ordered the replacement of 
Macarthur. 
 Both of these decisions illustrate how Truman evolved while in office and 
highlight another modern aspect of his foreign policy decision making style: the 
methodical and deliberate way in which he made decisions during the Korean War. 
Contrary to common stereotypes, Truman was actually quite methodical when deciding 
whether or not to involve U.S. troops in Korea and if he should fire MacArthur. In each 
case, he held multiple formal meetings with advisors and was constantly conferring with 
military and State Department officials. In the case of MacArthur, Truman did not 
succumb to his highly publicized impulsive temper. Instead of dismissing MacArthur on 
the spot, Truman held his feelings in check and was remarkably composed.44 He met 
repeatedly with his closest advisors, including Marshal, Acheson, Bradley, and Harriman, 
without ever once indicating whether or not he believed MacArthur should be relieved. 
Following the Joint Chiefs recommendation that MacArthur should be removed based 
upon strategic military concerns, Truman finally indicated that he was of the opinion that 
MacArthur was no longer needed and ordered the relevant papers to be drafted.45 By 
relieving MacArthur, Truman removed an annoying thorn in his side and allowed for 
more competent individuals to lead American forces on the Korean peninsula. 
Both of these decisions (committing ground forces in Korea and relieving 
MacArthur of command) represent an amazing exercise of self-restraint by Truman. They 
also clearly illustrate how, by going through multiple channels and by regularly                                                         43 Acheson 104. 44 McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 839. 45 McCullough 840. 
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conferring with military and civilian advisors in structured and formal meetings, Truman 
followed a clearly demarcated decision making structure which respected his staff 
hierarchy. All in all, these two decisions clearly reinforce the modernity of Harry 
Truman’s foreign policy decision-making style.  
Analysis 
 
Harry Truman Foreign Policy Decision Making Progression 
*Heavily influenced by the opinions of only a few primary advisors, mainly Roosevelt’s former Director of The Office 
of War Mobilization, James F. Byrnes 
 
 
When analyzing Truman’s foreign policy decision-making process, there are five 
different factors that, if present (or not present), indicated modernity, including the 
number of formal meetings held, the role of various advisors, the extent to which the 
decision was Truman’s, how much influence Roosevelt or his advisors played, and 
whether the decision followed the spokes of the wheel or hierarchical model of decision-
making laid out by Edwards and Wayne. Through examining the chart above, there are a 
few interesting cells that deserve recognition. 
 
 
Formal 
Meetings 
Role of 
Advisors 
Truman 
Decision 
Roosevelt 
Influence 
Spokes v. 
Hierarchical  
Atomic 
Bomb 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
Low 
 
High 
 
Spokes* 
Marshall 
Plan 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
Low 
 
Spokes 
Berlin 
Airlift 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Hierarchical 
Korean 
War 
 
High 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Low 
 
Hierarchical 
29
Gill: Presidential Modernity: Harry Truman and the Foreign Policy Decis
Published by University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well, 2016
 30 
 With the exception of the Berlin airlift in the Role of Advisors column, we see 
that the decision making process of Harry Truman followed a pattern that points to his 
modernity and how he affected the foreign policy decision making process of the 
presidency.  In terms of formal meetings, Truman held no meetings with advisors 
regarding the decision process to drop the Bomb. It was implied that the weapon was 
going to be used by America on Japan because that was the plan that Roosevelt pushed, 
James F. Byrnes advocated for, and Truman, nor any of his top advisors, truly 
questioned. This is why Roosevelt’s influence over the dropping of the Atomic Bomb is 
classified as high, whereas every subsequent foreign policy decision that was made by 
Truman saw little to no Roosevelt influence. By the time Truman decided to bail out 
Europe and the Marshall Plan was created/administered, most of Roosevelt’s advisors 
were no longer a part of Truman’s Administration, including James F. Byrnes, 
Roosevelt’s former Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Truman’s former 
Secretary of State who played a very large and vocal part in sticking to Roosevelt’s plan 
as it pertained to the Atomic Bomb. 
 This becomes a common trend in the cases other than the Atomic Bomb, that after 
enough time passed and Truman was able to surround himself with individuals he was 
comfortable with and respected (George Marshall or Dean Acheson), the decision making 
process became more efficient and centralized. Both the Berlin Airlift and The Korean 
War show how Truman was able to be a decisive leader. What set him apart from 
Roosevelt in this regard is that, when Roosevelt made decisions unilaterally and without a 
consensus from his advisors, Truman would make his decisions after every one of his 
advisors had voiced their opinion. Yet, after hearing all of his advisors’ opinions, it was 
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Truman who made the final decision. The buck stops here was not an overstatement, and 
that is why the cells for the Berlin Airlift and Korean War under “Truman Decision” are 
classified as High. 
 Overall, through examining various foreign policy events under Harry Truman’s 
presidency including the dropping of the Atomic Bomb, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin 
Airlift, and the Korean War, start to see a pattern emerge. This pattern saw Truman call 
more formal meetings than his predecessor, involved his advisors in the decision making 
process, became more decisive, shed the influence and obsession over Roosevelt’s 
preferences, and adopted the hierarchical model of decision-making that saw Truman 
surrounded by advisors who handled the minutia of details that did not require Truman’s 
attention; allowing the Missourian to act as the nexus for decision making and focus on 
the important issues that required significant attention. Even though he still exhibited 
some traits that wouldn’t be considered modern, such as his lack of initial consultation 
with advisors before deciding to order the Berlin Airlift, it was under the Truman 
administration that the important progression in institutionalized decision making style 
and process took place. Truman was able to bridge the gap between two important and 
well know presidential figures and create the decision-making framework that 
Eisenhower was able to build from. Harry Truman was able to overcome his 
predecessor’s shadow and make a significant and influential contribution to the operation 
of the foreign policy decision-making process of the modern executive branch. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31
Gill: Presidential Modernity: Harry Truman and the Foreign Policy Decis
Published by University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well, 2016
 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Works Cited: 
 
Burke, J. (2009). The Foundation of Honest Brokerage. In Honest broker?: The 
 National Security Advisor and Presidential Decision Making. College Station: 
 Texas A & M University Press. 
 
Edwards, G., & Wayne, S. (2010). Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy  
  Making (8th ed.). Boston, MA: Wadsworth. 
 
Ferrell, R. (1983). Harry S. Truman and the Modern American Presidency. Boston, 
   MA: Little, Brown. 
 
Hart, J. (1987). The Modern presidency: From Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Harper 
 & Row. 
 
James, D. (1969). The Contemporary Presidency. New York: Pegasus.  
 
Janis, I. (1972). Victims of Groupthink; a Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy 
 Decisions and Fiascoes. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin. 
32
Scholarly Horizons: University of Minnesota, Morris Undergraduate Journal, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/horizons/vol3/iss1/2
 33 
 
McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Newmann, W. W. (2014). Kennedy, Johnson, and Policy toward China: Testing the 
   Importance of the President in Foreign Policy Decision 
Making. Presidential  Studies Quarterly, 44(4), 640-672. 
 
Nichols, D. (1994). The Myth of the Modern Presidency. University Park, Pa.:  
 Pennsylvania State University Press. 
 
Pfiffner, J. (2000). The Modern Presidency. Boston, MA: Bedford St. Martin's Press. 
 
Redd, S. B. (2002). The Influence of Advisers on Foreign Policy Decision Making An 
 Experimental Study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 46(3), 335-364. 
 
Shaw, M. (1987). The Modern Presidency: From Roosevelt to Reagan. New York:  
  Harper & Row. 
 
Walcott, C. E., & Hult, K. M. (2005). White House Structure and Decision Making: 
 Elaborating the Standard Model. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 35(2), 303-
 318. 
 
Williams, P. (1987). The Modern Presidency: From Roosevelt to Reagan. New York:  
  Harper & Row. 
Cases: 
 
Acheson, D., & Acheson, D. (1971). The Korean War. New York: Norton. 
 
Bernstein, B. J. (1975). Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A  
  Reinterpretation. Political Science Quarterly, 23-69. 
 
Hess, G. (2009). Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and 
  Iraq (2nd ed.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
McCullough, D. (1992). Truman. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
 
Miller, R. (1998). To Save a City: The Berlin Airlift, 1948-1949. Washington, D.C. Air 
 Force History and Museums Program. 
 
Neustadt, R., & Neustadt, R. (1980). Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: 
 The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: John Wiley & 
 Sons. 
 
Price, H. (1955). The Marshall Plan and its Meaning. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University 
 Press. 
 
33
Gill: Presidential Modernity: Harry Truman and the Foreign Policy Decis
Published by University of Minnesota Morris Digital Well, 2016
 34 
Walker, J. (1997). Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the use of Atomic  
  Bombs against Japan. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
34
Scholarly Horizons: University of Minnesota, Morris Undergraduate Journal, Vol. 3 [2016], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.morris.umn.edu/horizons/vol3/iss1/2
